Mitigating election violence locally:
UN peacekeepers' election-education campaigns in Côte d'Ivoire

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In war-torn countries, elections are often accompanied by violence-inciting disinformation campaigns, including rumours and hate speech, which spur violent collective action. To counter such disinformation campaigns, United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) routinely organize election-education events. While the extant research tends to focus on how peacekeepers affect armed group and state behaviour, this study shifts the focus to civilians. It argues that peacekeepers' election education influences people's perceptions, attitudes and behaviours and reduces collective election violence locally. Learning about UN support for secure elections during such education events can convince people that political opponents will not be able to violently disturb elections, thereby mitigating fears of election violence. Also, election-education events provide politically relevant information that can strengthen political efficacy and people's ability to make use of peaceful political channels. Finally, peace messages during election-education events can change individuals' calculus about the utility and appropriateness of violent behaviour. Together, these activities can help people resist disinformation campaigns and, consequently, reduce violent protest and rioting locally. To test these expectations, I combine survey data on people' perceptions and attitudes, events data on violent protest and rioting, and a novel dataset on local-level election-education events carried out by the UN PKO in Côte d'Ivoire from 2009 to 2016. The results show that when the UN PKO is perceived to be an impartial arbiter, its election-education events have violence-reducing effects at the individual and subnational levels.

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Introduction

Holding credible elections can serve as a stepping stone to democratic governance in war-torn countries. Yet politicians often use disinformation campaigns, including rumours and hate speech, to manipulate elections. Disinformation campaigns can incite people to engage in violent protest and rioting which sometimes escalate into large-scale violence, as in Kenya in 2007 or Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 (Snyder, 2000: 65-66). The United Nations recognizes these risks. Election education to counter disinformation spread by politicians has become a prominent election violence prevention tool for United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) (Figure 1). Does it contribute to peaceful elections in war-torn countries? [1]

Figure 1 here

Election-education events combine civic and peace education focussed on elections. They are organized by UN PKOs' civilian personnel and provide ordinary people and local leaders in specific towns and villages with information on the UN PKOs' mandate to secure elections and the viability, utility and appropriateness of peaceful political behaviour. I argue that election-education events help people to resist politicians' disinformation campaigns and, consequently, reduce collective election violence. First, learning about UN PKOs' mandate may convince people that opponents cannot violently disturb elections, thereby reducing fear and related motives and justifications for violence. Second, information on the viability of *peaceful* political participation can increase political efficacy, lowering incentives for political violence. Third, peace messages highlighting the utility and appropriateness of non-violence introduce an alternative framing that contradicts disinformation campaigns and discourages the use of violent means. However, only if the UN PKO is perceived to be impartial will its election education change people's attitudes and reduce collective election violence.

The argument is explored using monthly data on UN PKOs' election-education events in 107 departments (third-tier administrative units) in Côte d'Ivoire between January 2009 and May 2016. Côte d'Ivoire is an ideal case for testing my argument. First, it fulfils the argument's scope condition:

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[1] The manuscript focusses on election-related violent protests and riots involving civilians as perpetrators. Violent protests and riots are collective actions directed towards members of other distinct groups or government authorities (Wilkinson, 2009). Election-related violent protests and riots often arise from politicians' disinformation campaigns, either as strategic products to affect the electoral process (Wilkinson, 2004) or as incidental side effects during electoral competition or due to concerns over electoral conduct (Burchard, 2015). Civilians may not be the only perpetrators of violent acts. As Brass (1997) reminds us, politicians may establish 'institutionalized riot systems' for which they hire 'violence specialists' (ibid, 15-16). Yet many researchers show that civilians retain agency (e.g. Krause, 2017; Varshney, 2002).

there is over-time and geographical variation in collective election violence perpetrated by civilians which election education aims to influence (e.g. Balcells, 2017: 164-170; Piccolino, 2018). Second, Côte d'Ivoire is a particularly tough case for which to find evidence of effective peacekeeping due to the large-scale post-election violence in 2011. If it is possible to find evidence here, we may begin to generalize the findings. Matching methods address the non-random location and timing of election-education events. Survey and event data analyses provide evidence for the argument: if the UN PKO is perceived to be impartial, election education decreases protests and riots during electoral periods by reducing people's fear, strengthening their political efficacy and limiting their intention to use violence.

The study contributes to the literature on peacekeeping and election violence. First, effective peacebuilding requires a transformation of the attitudes and behaviours of people locally (Stedman, 2002: 20). Yet case studies suggest that peacekeepers often remain ineffective at transforming attitudes and behaviours because they lack sensitivity to local contexts (Autesserre, 2014; Pouligny, 2000). Specific activities of UN PKOs have, however, received little systematic scrutiny. Evaluating election-education events locally may add nuance to the debate on the local turn in international peacebuilding. Second, previous works have presented mixed results on *whether* multidimensional peacekeeping missions build peace and foster democratization simultaneously (Steinert & Grimm, 2016; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Heldt, 2011; Fortna, 2008; Paris, 2004). By focussing on election education, this article examines the underlying mechanisms, or *how exactly* multidimensional peacekeeping contributes to peaceful democratization. Third, we know that election education has security-enhancing effects in usually peaceful environments (Collier & Vicente, 2014). This study is the first to investigate whether or not this finding translates to war-torn countries.

Information, election violence and peacekeeping intervention

Voter information and education play a crucial role in ensuring fair and peaceful elections in usually peaceful countries (Pande, 2011, for an overview). However, we know little about whether information and education also assist the peacefulness of elections in countries emerging from war. This is surprising given the education interventions in many UN peacekeeping curricula (Samii & Mvukiyehe, 2017), the debate about the local turn in peacebuilding practice (Autesserre, 2014) and the discussion on *whether and how* international interventions can achieve peaceful democratization after war (Fortna, 2008; Heldt, 2008). Thus, this study fills an important research gap by studying the consequences of election education in a war-torn country.

Extant research shows that the information available to voters influences election quality (Pande, 2011), including election violence (Collier & Vicente, 2014; Pande, 2011; Snyder, 2000). In non-consolidated democracies, voters often lack access to independent information. Not only are literacy rates and schooling years below the global average (Pande, 2011), political elites also manipulate information to mobilize voters (Boone 2011; Klaus & Mitchell, 2015; Snyder, 2000; Wilkinson, 2004). Election-related violence can be a deliberate or unintended product of politicians' disinformation campaigns, e.g. clientelist messages, threats, divisive rhetoric and hate speech (Boone, 2011; Klaus & Mitchell, 2015; Snyder, 2000; Wilkinson, 2004).

Given the salience of information for peaceful elections, it is not surprising that scholars explore how education interventions influence people's attitudes. Collier & Vicente (2014) demonstrate that a peace education campaign in Nigeria reduced electoral threats and vote shares for violent candidates, increased turnout and even reduced actual political intimidation. The security benefits of education interventions have received further support from other field experiments (Vicente, 2014; Fujiwara & Wantchekon, 2013) and a cross-national study (Muchlinski & Birch, 2017: 4). What is missing is an assessment of civic education efforts in *war-torn* countries. As Finkel, Horowitz & Rojo-Mendoza (2012: 64) write: 'The impact of civic education in more chronically inhospitable contexts (than Kenya) is still very much an open question.'

A violence-reducing effect is not obvious. The influence of *civilian*-focussed education might be limited because it fails to target the main perpetrators: state and non-state elites and violence specialists (Claes, 2016). The incentives of armed actors (rather than the perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of voters) may explain election violence (e.g. Birnir & Gohdes, 2018; Staniland, 2015). Moreover, Von Borzykowski & Kuhn (2018) show that informed voters are likely to become targets of election violence. Although their study looks at media exposure, their argument suggests that politicians use more violence against 'informed' participants after election-education events. Such targeting strategies could offset the security-enhancing effect of peacekeepers' education interventions. This study evaluates this possibility.

More generally, scholars debate whether international interventions contribute to peace locally. Some case studies are pessimistic about UN peacekeepers' ability to meaningfully engage with local communities because outside peacekeepers may lack sensitivity to and knowledge about local contexts (cf. Autesserre, 2014; Pouligny, 2000). In contrast, others assess the local turn in international peacebuilding more positively. Mvukiyehe & Samii (2017) provide experimental evidence that local education campaigns implemented by peacekeepers together with a Liberian civil society organization

increased peaceful political participation and encouraged people to report election violence (cf. Mvukiyehe, 2017). But can education campaigns influence actual violence in post-war elections?

Finally, analysing a specific type of peacekeeping activity, such as election education, provides an avenue for engaging with the puzzle of whether peacekeepers can simultaneously build peace and democracy (Paris, 2004). So far, the empirical literature has presented contradictory findings: Some works suggest that peacekeeping promotes peaceful democratization (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Grimm, 2008; Heldt, 2011). Others show that peacekeeping's positive and negative effects cancel each other out – for example, because internationally sponsored democratization causes greater instability (Fortna, 2008; Paris, 2004). These mixed findings suggest the need to empirically unpack peacekeepers' positive and negative effects and study their *specific* activities – for example, by exploring election education and its consequences for the peacefulness of elections.

Disinformation campaigns and collective violence in elections

During electoral periods in war-torn countries, politicians often employ violence-inciting disinformation campaigns (Beaulieu, 2014, Boone, 2011; Brass, 1997; Klaus & Mitchell, 2015; Snyder, 2000; Wilkinson, 2004; Varshney, 2002). Disinformation campaigns frequently highlight three elements: the threats posed by political opponents and, in the case of ethnically divided political systems, other ethnic groups (fear); the limited effectiveness of countering these threats through conventional political participation (political alienation); and the right to violent reactions (violence approval). The causes of violent protest and rioting are complex and may include the agency of 'violence specialists' (Brass 1997, 9). Yet fear, political alienation and approval of violence are important enabling conditions (Fearon & Laitin, 1996: 717–718; Gurr, 2000; Höglund, 2009, respectively). Politicians' disinformation is particularly impactful in conflict-ridden countries, where countervailing forces to neutralize it are weak. Hardened social boundaries reduce information exchange between former warring groups with divergent political identities (Fearon & Latin, 2000: 857ff.). Media outlets tend to remain divided and politicized (Snyder, 2000). Education events thus serve as an important source of independent information to counter disinformation and prevent collective violence.

Subnational patterns: election-education effects

Drawing on extant research, I argue that peacekeepers' election-education events provide people with information that helps them resist violence-inciting disinformation campaigns (Blattman, Blair & Hartman, 2014; Collier & Vicente, 2014; Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2017; Mvukiyehe, 2017; Sharma, 2019). As discussed in the next section, this information may mitigate people's fears, political

alienation, and approval of violence. By mitigating these motives for violence – spurred on by politicians' disinformation campaigns – election education may reduce collective election violence.

Though they do not directly target politicians, UN PKOs' election-education efforts may also indirectly influence politicians' electoral strategies as voters start to oppose violent politics (cf. Collier & Vicente, 2014). Worrying about their electoral fate, politicians may not only abandon disinformation campaigns but also refrain from hiring 'violence specialists' from organized armed groups. However, these effects on the violent strategies of politicians and organized armed groups are likely limited because these actors pursue their own agendas (Staniland, 2015) and usually do not participate in education interventions (Claes, 2016: 203). While positive indirect effects on 'top-down' election violence sponsored (jointly) by politicians and organized armed groups are possible,[2] the impact of election education should be most visible in relation to collective election violence.

Hypothesis 1: *The risk of violent protest and rioting in electoral periods is lower in localities where peacekeepers have organized more election-education events.*

Mechanisms: protection, political efficacy and peaceful behaviour

Three mechanisms plausibly connect UN PKOs' election-education events to a lower risk of collective violence during electoral periods. Each mechanism highlights a different informational aspect: Information on peacekeepers' mandate to secure elections alleviates people's fear of violence. Politically relevant information increases their political efficacy. Peace messages delegitimize violent behaviour.

First, learning about international support for peaceful elections during UN PKOs' election-education events can augment people's perceptions that political opponents are not able to target them with violence. By reducing people's fear of election violence, election education reduces the justification for collective violent action against political opponents and decreases people's incentives to follow calls for violent self-defence. Peacekeeping research supports the idea that deploying peacekeepers reduces violence associated with elections (Brancati & Snyder, 2013). UN PKOs do this by implementing electoral security plans, advising the election commission or securing the transport of electoral materials (Smidt, 2017). But only if citizens know about PKOs' security-enhancing activities can these activities affect citizens' beliefs about electoral security. By informing people about peacekeepers' mandates, education events can reduce insecurity. This argument resonates with the research on election monitoring. Receiving information on the activities of election monitors affected

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[2] Online Appendix K: Election education also reduces violence by non-state armed actors against civilians.

people's beliefs about the incumbents' ability to cheat in elections (Bush & Prather, 2019: 663-64; Brancati, 2014). Reinforcing this learning effect, election-education events in a specific locality may signal that the UN PKO has an interest in this locality. For instance, though people in Liberia were generally aware of the UN presence, seeing a UN military patrol sent a signal of protection and made people less afraid to report political intimidation (Mvukiyehe, 2017). In contrast to patrols, however, seeing unarmed civilian peacekeepers may signal interest but not necessarily protection. Instead, the signal of interest may become a signal of protection through the information about peacekeepers' mandate to secure elections that is provided via election-education events.

Hypothesis 1a: *Greater exposure to election education makes people less afraid of election violence.*

Second, election education provides people with politically relevant information. Civilian peacekeepers emphasize the viability of peaceful political participation. Extant research shows that such information stimulates participation in national politics, such as voting (e.g. Collier & Vicente, 2014), contributing money to a political campaign or contacting government officials (e.g. Mvukiyehe, 2017). Micro-level empirical evidence supports Gurr's proposition that the availability of political action channels to attain political goals can mitigate individuals' incentives for collective violence (Bohara, Mitchell & Nepal, 2006; Finkel; Horowitz & Rojo-Mendoza, 2012; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Gurr, 2000). As such, the provision of politically relevant information via election-education events should mitigate collective violence by increasing political efficacy.

Hypothesis 2b: *Greater exposure to election education increases people's political efficacy.*

Election-education events organized by UN PKOs also employ peace messaging. That is, civilian peacekeepers highlight the utility and normative value of peaceful political behaviour. These messages are often reiterated by local leaders, such as customary authorities and state officials, and 'practiced' through common activities, such as football matches. We know from political communication research that new information can lead people to resist the initial framing of an issue (Druckman, 2004). Peace messages may thus motivate people to question violence-inciting disinformation (cf. also Kaufman, 2006). Experimental evidence from Northern India suggests that anti-violence appeals by local religious leaders made Sunni followers more likely to adopt peaceful behaviours, though these appeals were less effective in the victimized Shia group (Sharma, 2018). A citizen from Côte d'Ivoire has put it this way: 'The politicians, they come to incite this thing [violence], but it just needs a good understanding, we will live in perfect harmony' (Interviewee in Piccolino, 2018: 12). Overall, peace messages may make people less inclined to use violence.

Hypothesis 2c: *Greater exposure to election-education campaigns reduces people's propensity to use violence for a political cause.*

Caveats: local perceptions of UN peacekeepers

Election-education events cannot impose behavioural change. Their effects hinge on people's perceptions. However, capacity constraints may diminish UN PKOs' power of persuasion. Election-education events are short (usually one day) and are organized by international peacekeepers who may lack relevant local knowledge and sensitivity to local contexts (Autesserre, 2014; Pouligny, 2000). Election education also does not physically change the security environment and solely relies on persuasion. Yet as discussed above, there is a growing base of evidence that even short-term information campaigns sponsored by international organizations can change political behaviour (Blattman, Hartman & Blair, 2014; Collier & Vicente, 2014; Mvukiyehe, 2017; Samii & Mvukiyehe, 2017).

A possibly more severe constraint is that the success of election education hinges on the trustworthiness of the UN PKO. If people do not trust the UN PKO, they may refuse to attend its education events and mistrust its information content. A lack of perceived impartiality undermines trustworthiness. For instance, Bush & Prather (2018) show that election monitoring in Tunisia only improved perceptions of electoral credibility if people viewed the monitors as impartial. Another study in Bangladesh concludes that 'given the widely held perception that the commission [the sponsor of the peace messages] was a partisan tool, the [peace] messages seemed to have a limited effect' (MacDonald 2016, 47).

Civilians should form their views about peacekeepers through experience. Gordon and Young (2017) show that people exposed to abuse by peacekeepers lose trust in their effectiveness and benevolence. Perceived victimization by UN PKOs may hence render their education interventions ineffective. Beyond experience, elite persuasion can also influence the trustworthiness of peacekeepers. Piccolino and Karlrud (2011) find that state officials mobilized popular opposition to peacekeeping by publicly discrediting peacekeeping efforts as biased and harmful to the nation. Therefore, it is possible that specific groups of individuals mistrust international intervention. Yet, only if the UN PKO is perceived to be impartial and trustworthy can election-education campaigns sooth fears, alleviate political alienation, mitigate individual incentives for violence and reduce collective violence.

Hypothesis 3: *Variation in the effectiveness of election education depends on whether people perceive the UN PKO to be trustworthy.*

Elections and peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire is a West African country of roughly 23 million people. In 2002, civil war broke out. In 2003, regional peacekeeping forces and French troops intervened. In 2004, the regional peacekeeping mission was re-hatted and became the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). In 2010, long-overdue elections were held (Bekoe, 2018). Former president Laurent Gbagbo refused to accept the internationally recognized election victory of his long-time rival Alassane Ouattara. Fighting and attacks against civilians ensued, leading to over 3,000 deaths (Bassett, 2011). In April 2011, UN peacekeepers helped the French military and Ouattara-loyal forces to arrest Laurent Gbagbo.

At least since this peace enforcement intervention, many supporters of Laurent Gbagbo's party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), have doubted the impartiality of the UN PKO. FPI supporters feel victimized and repeat FPI politicians' accusations that peacekeepers lack impartiality (cf. Piccolini, 2018: 12-13).[3] As the FPI speaker explained, '[w]e have no interest [in meetings with UNOCI]. This is because for creating trust, one must have trust in the body that seeks to create trust.'[4] In contrast, the UN PKO enjoys more trust among people without any party identification and people who support the government coalition, the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) and the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) (Piccoloni, 2018).

Since the introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s, elections in Côte d'Ivoire have been contentious. Politicians regularly use disinformation campaigns to mobilize voters. They stoke local communities' fears of violent eviction from ancestral land by arguing that election results affect land tenure security (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015: 4). They emphasize political injustices and alienate people from peaceful politics (Piccolino, 2018: 12). They legitimize violence against political opponents by emphasizing the other's evil nature and recalling past atrocities (ibid: 11). UNOCI engaged in civic education to alleviate fears, reduce political alienation and delegitimize violence. Surprisingly, even after the 2011 electoral crisis, the content of its election-education events did not visibly change. Online Appendix J further assesses the impact of potential over-time variation. Moreover, UNOCI radio disseminated civic education programmes. While UNOCI radio may have reduced violence nationally it cannot explain subnational variations in violence because broadcasting is nation-wide.

Côte d'Ivoire is an ideal case for examining the consequences of election education. First, it fulfils the argument's scope condition: the behaviour of civilians matters for the occurrence of collective election violence. While violence specialists have also played a role in escalating protests and riots, civilians –

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[3] My interviews with members of the FPI party in October 2015.
[4] My interview with Boubakar Koné in Abidjan, September 2015.

e.g. individual youths, youth militia groups and civilian self-defence militias – have been involved in committing violent acts (cf. Piccolino, 2018: 8; Balcells, 2017: 164-170). For example, 'in the village of Tinhou, several Guéré PDCI leaders were attacked by their Guéré neighbours, who were fervent FPI supporters' (International Crisis Group 2014: 12). Though these acts may appear spontaneous, they tend to be incited by politicians (Piccolino, 2018: 8). The Human Rights Watch (2011: 5) report on the post-electoral crisis in 2010/2011 recalls that 'Gbagbo's mouthpieces went further, comparing Ouattara supporters to "rats" and "culled birds" and exhorting followers to set up roadblocks and "denounce foreigners" – a call followed immediately by gruesome, targeted violence.' While violent protests and riots accounted for only 17% of violent events during the 2010 electoral period, they made up 48 per % of all violent events during the 2011, 2013 and 2015 electoral periods. Second, Côte d'Ivoire provides a particularly tough case for the argument because the 2010/2011 post-election violence may have diminished perceptions of UNOCI's capacity to secure the electoral environment. By identifying the effect of UNOCI's election education in Côte d'Ivoire, we can begin to generalize the findings to analogous post-conflict cases.

Research design

The subnational relationship between election education and violent protest and rioting (Hypothesis 1) is explored across 107 departments (third-tier administrative units) and four electoral periods.[5] The electoral periods include the three months before and after the second round of the 2011 presidential elections, the 2011 legislative election, the 2013 municipal election and the 2015 presidential election. The micro-level mechanisms (hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c) are explored using survey data from 2013 and 2014. The impact of peacekeepers' perceived trustworthiness (Hypothesis 3) is explored at both the subnational and the individual level. Both analyses employ ordered logit regression with region dummies. Standard errors are clustered by department.

To capture UN peacekeepers' election-education activities at the local level, I collected novel data from 8,454 French and English press releases published on the UNOCI website (UNOCI News, 2017). Because of the large number of articles, I combined manual coding with an automated coding procedure (see Online Appendix B). Between January 2009 and May 2016, UNOCI reportedly organized 598 election-education events. Election-education events are community-based events in specific towns and villages. They invite local leaders (including customary authorities, civil society

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[5] The sample excludes the autonomous district of Abidjan. Because Abidjan is home to more than 4 million people, a much smaller proportion of its residents participates in election-education events compared to other departments. Thus, the spatial effect likely remains invisible.

representatives, youth leaders, and local government officials) and ordinary citizens from different political and ethnic groups. During the event, civilian peacekeeping personnel explain the UN PKOs' mandate and emphasize the viability, benefit and moral value of peaceful political participation. Theatre, football matches and other activities are sometimes used to put peaceful behaviour 'into practice'. The following is an example of a press release about UNOCI's election education:

> UNOCI encourages Dabrouza inhabitants to promote peaceful presidential election in 2015: … The UNOCI delegation to the event was led by Said Bacar Husseine of the Civil Affairs Office in Daloa who encouraged the population to continue their efforts to bring Côte d'Ivoire to a lasting peace. 'Peace will not be effective unless you forget your grudges and exercise forgiveness,' he advised. He called on them to work towards a peaceful presidential election that would be free of violence in 2015. 'Elections are like a game. Your choice should be based on the candidate whose programme convinces you and avoid the use of violence for whatever reason,' he cautioned. Other UNOCI staff took turns to educate the population about the mandate of their different sections and stressed the need for peaceful coexistence as the sole guarantee for the development of their village. (UNOCI News, 2014)

Main independent variables

For the subnational analyses, I create a count of election-education events in each department within the six months prior to the start of an electoral period. For the individual-level analysis, I calculate each survey respondent's weighted exposure to election-education events. That is, I take the inverse of the distance from an election-education event in a specific (precisely geolocated) village or town to a respondent location. I disregard events more than 10 km away from respondents and total the remaining inverse distances in the past six months.

Figures 2 and 3 plot election-education activities over time and the geographic spread of these events between January 2009 and May 2016, respectively. The temporal pattern reveals an increase in election education in the months before an election. The spatial pattern shows that interventions clustered in departments located in the violence-prone western part of the country and in departments with UN Human Rights Offices (yellow squares).[6] International and domestic civil society organizations also organize election-education events, which are not captured in the data. Given UNOCI's superior personnel and material resources, however, UNOCI-sponsored events are likely more prevalent across space and time. Thus, it is unlikely that a statistical effect of UNOCI education events results from omitted education efforts by others, though I cannot rule out this possibility.

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[6] Human Rights Offices are located in the following towns: Abidjan, Aboisso, Bondoukou, Bouaké, Duékoué, Daloa, Divo, Korhogo, Man, Odienne, San Pedro, Tai (from June 2012), Toulepleu, Yamoussoukro.

Figures 2 and 3 here

As explained above, in Côte d'Ivoire, supporters of the opposition party of Laurent Gbagbo tend to mistrust the UN PKO. To test Hypothesis 3, the subnational analysis includes the interaction between the count of election-education events and an indicator for the departments that are strongholds of Laurent Gbagbo's FPI. The individual-level analysis includes the interaction between the exposure to election-education campaigns and individuals' support for the FPI.

Dependent variables

As a dependent variable to test Hypothesis 1, the analysis employs the count of violent protests and riots in a department over an electoral period. The information is taken from an integrated version of the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) and the African Conflict Locations and Events Dataset (ACLED). Duplicate events are discarded using an automated, transparent and reproducible methodology developed by Donnay et al. (2018). A total of 49 events of violent protest and rioting are recorded in the four electoral periods.

Instead of identifying *election-related* violence by the event's issue, I identify relevant events according to their timing, for two reasons. First, extant case literature suggests that violent protests and rioting in Côte d'Ivoire shortly before and after elections likely stem from electoral dynamics (e.g. Klaus & Mitchell, 2015, for evidence). Second, existing events datasets that identify election violence according to the event issues are not suitable. The VECO dataset by Fjelde & Höglund (2018) does not capture low-level violent protest and rioting but rather lethal violent conflict that causes at least ten fatalities per calendar year.[7] The SCAD dataset records only six department-months with election-related violence between 2009 and 2016. Given the large-scale election violence in 2011, this seems to be an undercount (Bassett, 2011). To further alleviate concerns regarding operationalization, the robustness tests show similar results for Hypothesis 1 if the analyses use the Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV) dataset by Daxecker and Amicarelli (2018) available for the 2010 and 2011 elections. Figure 4 shows the temporal distribution of all violent protest and riots compared to all other types of violence, and Figure 5 shows their spatial distribution.

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[7] There were only seven events of lethal election-related violence in 2010 and 2011 (the post-electoral crisis period), one event in 2012 and one event in 2015.

Figures 4 and 5 here

The individual-level measures to test hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c come from the geocoded Afrobarometer surveys from March 2013 (round 5) and September 2014 (round 6) (BenYishay et al., 2017). To capture the perceived threat of violence during the election campaign (Hypothesis 2a), survey respondents were asked in rounds 5 and 6: 'During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?' (Afrobarometer Data, 2018). The answers ranged from not at all (0) to a little bit (1), somewhat (2) and a lot (3). To capture political efficacy (Hypothesis 2b), I use a survey item related to contact with the government. Respondents were asked in rounds 5 and 6: 'During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: Official of a government agency' (ibid). The answers ranged from never (0), to only once (1), a few times (2), and often (3). Finally, the survey round 5 in the Afrobarometer provides a proxy for people's propensity to use political violence (Hypothesis 2c): 'Please tell me if you have personally done one of these actions in the last twelve months: Use coercion or violence for a political cause.' The answers ranged from 'I would never do it' (0) to 'I would do it if I had the chance' (1), 'one or two times' (2), 'a few times' (3) and 'often' (4). Figure 6 depicts the spatial distribution of the three variables by survey round, with the size of the circles indicating the number of respondents in specific locations.

Figures 6 here

Control variables

Both the subnational and individual-level analyses control for potentially confounding factors. First, subnational deployment of police and military (*UN police* and *UN military)* may decrease violence and, consequently, enable election-education activities. I collected personnel data myself using the methodology developed by Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis (2017).[8] Second, the analyses add a measure for *competitiveness*.[9] Balcells (2017) observes that violence in Côte d'Ivoire is positively related to

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[8] Information taken from the deployment maps of Secretary-General reports on UNOCI.
[9] For January 2009 through December 2013, I calculate the departmental margin of victory between Ouattara and Gbagbo in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections. For January 2014 to May 2016, I use the difference between Ouattara's vote share and the share of abstentions from the 2015 presidential elections because the party loyal to Gbagbo largely boycotted the elections.

parity between government and opposition. Electoral tensions should attract education interventions. Third, geographical features should influence both peacekeepers' ability to organize events and collective violence (Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis, 2017). Thus, I include *travel time*, which provides the average travel time (in minutes) to get from a department to the nearest major city of over 50,000 inhabitants by land.[10] Fourth, I add *border distance*, which is the distance from the centre of each department to the border of the nearest neighbouring country (in kilometres).[11] Places closer to borders tend to be more violence-prone due to the influx of violence specialists from neighbouring countries, thereby attracting more peacekeeping deployment and potentially also election education. Fifth, the analyses control for the departmental *infant mortality rate* to approximate socio-economic development, which may influence the risk of violence and, in turn, UN PKOs' activity.[12] *Infant mortality rate, border distance* and *travel time* come from the PRIO-GRID data frame (Tollefsen, Strand & Buhaug, 2012). Finally, the number of people living in a department should determine the likelihood of election-related violence and efforts by UN peacekeepers (*population size*).[13] The subnational analyses also include the cumulative count of violent events in the twelfth to seventh month before the start date of the electoral period (*baseline violence*). The individual-level analyses control for party affiliation – that is, the RDR (the party of the president), the PDCI (the government coalition partner) and the FPI (the main opposition party), with no party affiliation as the baseline – as well as gender and education.[14] This information is obtained from Afrobarometer. Summary statistics are provided in Online Appendix A.

Endogeneity

Peacekeepers are present in places at higher risk of violence (Fjelde, Hultman & Nilsson, 2018; Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis, 2018). Comparing the spatial distributions of election education (Figure 3) and violent events (Figure 5) suggests that this finding may also apply to election-education interventions. If election education targets the hardest cases, the statistical analysis underestimates its effectiveness in reducing collective violence.

To examine this possibility, I fit models of election-education events in the past six and three months, respectively. Table 1 shows that election education is indeed more prevalent in more violence-prone locations. *Baseline violence* and *population size* have positive and significant effects

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[10] Uchida & Nelson (2009).
[11] Weidmann, Kuse & Gleditsch (2010).
[12] Storeygard, Balk, Levy & Deane (2008); Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University (2005).
[13] Data is obtained from the Institut National de la Statistique (2014).
[14] Education is measured on a ten-point scale from 'no formal schooling' (0) to 'post-graduate education' (9).

in models 1a and 1b. All else being equal, one additional event of violence increases the likelihood of election education by approximately three percentage points. In Model 1b, travel time to the next biggest city and UN troops also have significant effects. As UN troops go to violence-prone places, this finding supports my expectation about the selection process.

Table 1 here

Next, I pre-process the sample to create a more balanced distribution of covariates. I use coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus, King & Porro, 2011). CEM creates a quasi-experimental sample in which the matching variables are similarly distributed across departments with and without election-education events in the past. CEM discards control observations that are too drastically different from treated observations. For the remaining cases, CEM produces weights that adjust remaining imbalances in the distributions of the matching variables. I use *baseline violence* and *population size* as matching variables because of their strong correlation with election education.[15]

As Table 2 shows, the balance on all matching variables significantly improves after matching. The overall imbalance measure L1 shrinks from 39.5 to 16.5. L1 represents the percentage of observations with election education that do not have a 'matching' control observation without election education but with similar values of *baseline violence* and *population size*. While pre-processing the sample with matching will not recover the exact causal effect, due among other things to unobserved confounding, it should help to better approximate the true impact of election education on election violence.

Table 2 here

Analyses and results

The statistical analyses support the argument that UN PKOs' election-education events can mitigate violent protest and rioting (Hypothesis 1) by soothing fears of election violence (Hypothesis 2a), reducing political alienation (Hypothesis 2b) and delegitimizing violence (Hypothesis 2c). Yet election education makes little difference in strongholds and among supporters of the opposition, where the UN tends to be perceived as biased (Hypothesis 3).

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[15] To avoid post-treatment bias, baseline violence captures violent events in the twelve to seven months before the start of the electoral period.

Findings on the subnational impact of election education

Table 3 presents the analyses of violent protest and rioting across electoral periods and departments. Supporting Hypothesis 1, election-education campaigns in the six months prior to an electoral period have a negative effect coefficient in Model 1. When excluding FPI strongholds in Model 2, however, the coefficient becomes larger and turns significant. Model 3 includes the interaction between election education and FPI strongholds. Election education maintains its negative effect, while the interaction is positive. On average, election education reduces collective violence in competitive districts and government strongholds, but not in the 22 FPI strongholds. Models 4 to 6 are estimated based on the post-matching sample and yield substantively the same results. The average probability of violent protest and rioting outside FPI strongholds decreases from 7.3% to 0.1% with an increasing number of election-education events (Figure 7).[16]

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       Table 4 here
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       Figure 7 here
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The effects of the control variables match prior expectations. Deploying more *UN military and police* tends to decrease the risk of collective violence, though only the coefficient for police is statistically significant. Electoral *competitiveness* has the expected positive effect. *Travel time and border distance* have no effects. *Infant mortality* is negatively related to violent protests and riots, suggesting that these events take place in less socio-economically marginalized places. Finally, collective violence occurs more often in more populous departments (*population size*) with a history of violence (*baseline violence*).

Findings on the individual-level impact of election education

The survey data analyses provide support for all three mechanism hypotheses. Table 5 presents the ordered logit regressions on fear of election violence. Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the coefficient for election-education exposure is negative across all models. When the analysis excludes respondents who support the FPI (Model 8) or includes the interaction between election education and FPI support (Model 9), the coefficient for election-education exposure becomes significant. This finding supports Hypothesis 3. Table 6 presents the analysis of contact with government officials. Supporting Hypothesis 2b, the coefficient for election education is positive and significant across all models

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[16] The graph illustrates the predicted probability of one violent event.

(models 10 to 12). Supporting Hypothesis 3, the effect is larger among non-FPI supporters (Model 11). Finally, Table 7 shows the analysis of the intention to use political violence. While the coefficient for election education is negative across models, it never turns significant at conventional levels (models 13 to 16). In contrast to Hypothesis 3, the size of this coefficient is smaller when the sample excludes FPI supporters (Model 14). One explanation is that election education only affects party supporters. The interaction between FPI support and election education in Model 15 and the interaction between support for any political party and election education in Model 16 have very similar effects.

Table 5 here

Table 6 here

Table 7 here

To interpret these results, I calculate the average predicted effect of election education on these individual-level attitudes and perceptions. As expected by Hypothesis 3, election education has no effect on fear and political efficacy among FPI supporters. Yet election-education exposure reduces fears of violence (Figure 8) and increases the frequency of contact with the government (Figure 9) among respondents without party identity (43% of the sample) as well as supporters of the government coalition (31% of the sample). Election-education exposure reduces the predicted intention to use political violence among *all* respondents (Figure 10). There is a plausible explanation: peace messages speak to universal values of non-violence. The messages are reiterated by local leaders who may have ties to FPI supporters. Therefore, FPI respondents' predisposition to the UN PKO should matter less in determining whether they heed the message.

Figures 8 to 10

For the control variables, while departmental characteristics have no impact, the effects of respondents' characteristics fit prior expectations. Support for the government parties (RDR and PDCI) are associated with less fear of election violence and more contact with officials. RDR supporters are more likely to say that they intend to use or have used violence. An average female respondent exhibits greater fear, feels less politically empowered, and is less inclined to use violence than an average male

respondent. Finally, more formal education correlates with lower fear, greater political efficacy and lower support for violence.

Robustness tests

The results of the individual-level and subnational analyses are robust to various alternative model specifications and tests. Online Appendix C shows that election-education exposure has a similar effect when 5 km or 25 km cut-off points are used, or no cut-off is used. Online Appendix D perfectly replicates the analyses of fear, political efficacy and violence propensity, with multi-level models accounting for unobserved differences between respondents in different departments. Online Appendix E shows that the violence-reducing impact of UN PKO's election education is not due to a spatial displacement effect. Online Appendix F provides substantively similar results for the effect of election-education events within three rather than six months prior to the electoral period. Online Appendix G shows that the results remain robust for the separated pre-electoral and post-electoral periods. Online Appendix H uses data from Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV) dataset (Daxecker & Amicarelli, 2018) for the 2010 and 2011 elections. Even with these different data, the results lend support to the argument and Hypothesis 1. Finally, Online Appendix J shows that election-education events had a stronger impact on reducing collective violence during the 2013 and 2015 elections than during the 2010 and 2011 elections. More tailored election-education programming after the 2011 electoral crisis is a plausible explanation.

Conclusion

To conclude, the analyses provide evidence that election education sponsored by UN PKOs can enhance the peacefulness of election processes in countries emerging from civil war. Across subnational locations in Côte d'Ivoire, election education has reduced violent protests and rioting. On the individual level, election education mitigates people's fears of election violence, increases their political efficacy and lowers their propensity to use political violence. However, UNOCI's election education does not increase security and political efficacy among opposition supporters who tend to mistrust UN peacekeepers. Correspondingly, election education only weakly reduces collective violence in the opposition's electoral strongholds.

Evaluating external validity is difficult because we lack subnational data on election-education programmes for other countries. In principal, election education could be useful beyond Côte d'Ivoire because disinformation campaigns regularly trigger collective violence during electoral periods in other emerging democracies – for instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda and

Zimbabwe (Boone 2011:1033). However, further research on specific interventions is needed to establish generalizability. In addition, UN PKOs do not work in a vacuum. Domestic and international civil society actors sponsor similar election-education campaigns. It is imperative to evaluate their potentially complementary effects.

From a policy perspective, the findings suggest that election education is a worthwhile addition to the UN peacekeeping curricula. With the data at hand, however, we cannot assess the relative benefits of election education compared to other election-assistance activities. If election education becomes part of the peacebuilding repertoire, this study should prompt policymakers to remain attentive to two caveats: First, only if local people trust the UN's impartiality can election education fulfil its full potential in enhancing electoral security. Second, the impact of election education may be limited to curbing acts of collective violence, contingent on people's perceptions and attitudes.

The results have several implications for extant research on election violence prevention and post-war peacebuilding. First, the positive impact of peacekeepers' election education suggests that outside interveners can sometimes overcome the many obstacles to meaningful local engagement (see also Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2017; Mvukiyehe, 2017). However, while the findings speak against a uniformly negative assessment of local peacebuilding, peacekeepers' election-education efforts have largely failed among a crucial constituency: politically alienated opposition supporters. Thus, the results also highlight the importance of local perceptions for peacekeeping success (e.g. Autesserre, 2014). Second, the study speaks to the debate on whether peacekeepers can simultaneously build democracy and peace (e.g. Brancati & Snyder, 2013; Fortna, 2008). The findings suggest that peacekeeping operations may assist peaceful war-to-democracy transitions when they invest in election education. Third, the analyses provide an answer to the question posed by Finkel, Horowitz & Rojo-Mendoza (2012) on whether educating citizens works in chronically inhospitable environments. Finally, the findings show that civilian agency plays a role in election violence. The study therefore adds to the recent body of research exploring the spatial patterns and micro-foundations of election-related contention (Daxecker, 2018; Fjelde & Höglund, 2018; Von Borzyskowski & Kuhn, 2018).

Data replication: The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.

The analyses have been conducted with Stata, version 13. The data preparation was carried out in R, version 3.4.3 (2017-11-30).

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Tables

Table 1. Analyses of election-education campaigns

VARIABLES	Elect. educ. 6 months lag Model M1a	Elect. educ. 3 months lag Model M1b
Competitiveness	-0.252	0.477
	(0.512)	(0.554)
UN Police	-0.131	-0.153
	(0.172)	(0.186)
UN Military	0.118	0.466+
	(0.218)	(0.238)
Travel time	0.153	0.260*
	(0.148)	(0.129)
Border distance	0.0306	-0.254
	(0.180)	(0.261)
Infant mortality	0.0293	0.0518
	(0.106)	(0.122)
Population size	0.787**	0.727**
	(0.116)	(0.119)
Baseline violence	0.330*	0.318+
	(0.160)	(0.163)
Constant	-1.180**	-2.292**
	(0.275)	(0.325)
Observations	428	428
Log-Likelihood	-208.4	-159.3
BIC	471.3	373.2
AIC	434.8	336.7

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 2. Pre- and post-matching imbalances

	Pre-matching sample		Post-matching sample	
	L1	Mean diff.	L1	Mean diff.
Population size	0.356	0.831	0.048	0.068
Baseline violence	0.143	0.244	0.065	0.021
Sample size	N=428 (104 treated)		N=419 (99 treated)	

Table 3. Analyses of protest and rioting in the electoral period

	Pre-matching			Post-matching		
	Model 1 Full sample	Model 2 No FPI str.	Model 3 Interaction	Model 4 Full sample	Model 5 No FPI str.	Model 6 Interaction
Election educ. (past 6 months)	-0.572	-1.399**	-1.187**	-1.011**	-1.452*	-1.167**
	(0.486)	(0.455)	(0.387)	(0.312)	(0.582)	(0.319)
Stronghold Gbagbo (FPI) = 1			1.079			1.197
			(0.877)			(1.394)
Election educ.* Stronghold			2.055**			1.229
			(0.737)			(1.009)
Competitiveness	2.554+	-1.450	3.059*	1.202	-2.334	1.769
	(1.548)	(2.561)	(1.429)	(1.930)	(3.816)	(1.738)
UN Police	-0.591+	-1.420**	-0.562+	-0.613+	-1.964*	-0.686+
	(0.355)	(0.503)	(0.332)	(0.354)	(0.937)	(0.353)
UN Military	-0.366	0.230	-0.250	-0.129	0.451	-0.0221
	(0.566)	(0.928)	(0.610)	(0.681)	(1.856)	(0.716)
Travel time	-0.801	-0.511	-0.357	-0.285	-0.176	0.0362
	(0.531)	(0.840)	(0.561)	(0.722)	(1.115)	(0.588)
Border distance	0.497	0.572	1.125	1.659	-1.271	1.964+
	(0.738)	(0.980)	(0.791)	(1.132)	(1.876)	(1.127)
Infant mortality	-0.582+	-1.143+	-0.916*	-0.674*	-1.622	-0.819*
	(0.318)	(0.682)	(0.425)	(0.335)	(1.202)	(0.408)
Population size	0.959**	1.445*	1.215**	1.241**	2.137*	1.337**
	(0.319)	(0.591)	(0.290)	(0.283)	(1.013)	(0.290)
Baseline violence	0.690*	0.894**	0.905**	0.982*	1.345**	1.110**
	(0.299)	(0.298)	(0.348)	(0.422)	(0.446)	(0.396)
Constant cut 1	3.999**	0.180	8.037**	5.230**	-3.576	11.59**
	(1.290)	(2.439)	(1.451)	(1.698)	(5.390)	(3.149)
Constant cut 2	5.166**	1.856	8.885**	7.536**	-0.356	12.56**
	(1.232)	(2.532)	(1.330)	(1.793)	(5.574)	(3.004)
Constant cut 3	6.309**	4.039	5.536**	9.804**	2.474	6.902**
	(1.253)	(3.338)	(1.463)	(2.265)	(7.251)	(2.600)
Constant cut 4	7.036**		6.775**	10.77**		9.255**
	(1.190)		(1.396)	(2.244)		(2.679)
Observations	428	340	428	419	328	419
Log-Likelihood	-96.4	-56.6	-91.4	-85.3	-45.0	-84.2
BIC	459.4	352.3	461.6	436.3	153.6	446.2
AIC	280.8	195.3	274.9	258.6	111.9	260.4

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 4. Analyses of fear of election campaign violence

VARIABLES	Model 7 Full sample	Model 8 Without FPI	Model 9 Interaction
Election-education exposure (10 km)	-0.175	-0.333**	-0.259*
	(0.109)	(0.125)	(0.121)
Party: FPI	0.110		0.0567
	(0.120)		(0.124)
Election-education exposure (10 km) * FPI			0.357
			(0.222)
Party: RDR	-0.476**	-0.474**	-0.477**
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)
Party: PDCI	-0.123	-0.166	-0.124
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)
Gender	0.315**	0.279**	0.312**
	(0.0864)	(0.0960)	(0.0865)
Education	-0.0411+	-0.0425+	-0.0403+
	(0.0224)	(0.0244)	(0.0224)
Competitiveness	0.0990	-0.765	0.113
	(0.658)	(0.732)	(0.658)
UN Police	0.150	0.284	0.136
	(0.325)	(0.367)	(0.325)
UN Military	-0.0228	0.0710	-0.0122
	(0.332)	(0.378)	(0.332)
Travel time	0.00579	-0.0846	0.00887
	(0.124)	(0.141)	(0.124)
Border distance	0.142	0.171	0.141
	(0.236)	(0.266)	(0.236)
Infant mortality	0.0975	0.103	0.0994
	(0.0834)	(0.0906)	(0.0834)
Population size	0.0501	0.0806	0.0516
	(0.0625)	(0.0696)	(0.0625)
Constant cut 1	-0.618	-1.131	-0.619
	(0.684)	(0.758)	(0.684)
Constant cut 2	0.355	-0.152	0.356
	(0.684)	(0.757)	(0.684)
Constant cut 3	0.970	0.421	0.972
	(0.685)	(0.757)	(0.685)
Observations	1,879	1,522	1,879
Log-Likelihood	-2419.9	-1947.9	-2418.6
BIC	5194.1	4232.9	5199.0
AIC	4933.8	3987.8	4933.1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$

Table 5. Analyses of contacting government officials

VARIABLES	Model 10 Full sample	Model 11 Without FPI	Model 12 Interaction
Civic education exposure (10 km)	0.707**	0.950**	0.885**
	(0.243)	(0.289)	(0.256)
Party: FPI	0.364		0.609+
	(0.301)		(0.313)
Civic education exposure (10 km) * FPI			-103.5
			(7,817)
Party: RDR	0.922**	0.962**	0.930**
	(0.273)	(0.279)	(0.274)
Party: PDCI	1.222**	1.306**	1.242**
	(0.301)	(0.308)	(0.302)
Gender	-0.804**	-0.705**	-0.794**
	(0.215)	(0.237)	(0.216)
Education	0.0896+	0.118*	0.0883+
	(0.0512)	(0.0556)	(0.0515)
Competitiveness	-2.766+	-3.802*	-2.841+
	(1.640)	(1.892)	(1.643)
UN Police	-1.492+	-1.699+	-1.390
	(0.864)	(0.974)	(0.868)
UN Military	2.239*	2.614*	2.176*
	(0.937)	(1.089)	(0.939)
Travel time	-0.291	-0.339	-0.280
	(0.313)	(0.372)	(0.316)
Border distance	-1.758**	-1.929**	-1.743**
	(0.643)	(0.719)	(0.644)
Infant mortality	0.406	0.308	0.398
	(0.256)	(0.269)	(0.261)
Population size	-1.342	-2.480	-1.510
	(2.485)	(2.732)	(2.484)
Constant cut 1	1.469	1.129	1.506
	(1.706)	(1.917)	(1.705)
Constant cut 2	1.925	1.595	1.964
	(1.707)	(1.918)	(1.706)
Constant cut 3	3.167+	2.887	3.211+
	(1.716)	(1.929)	(1.715)
Observations	1,883	1,525	1,883
Log-Likelihood	-503.3	-402.7	-499.4
BIC	1360.9	1142.6	1360.7
AIC	1100.5	897.4	1094.8

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$

Table 3. Analyses of intention or experience of using violence for a political cause

VARIABLES	Model 13 Full sample	Model 14 No FPI	Model 15 Interaction 1	Model 16 Interaction 2
Civic education exposure (10 km)	-0.634	-0.283	-0.466	-0.215
	(0.448)	(0.549)	(0.460)	(0.466)
Party: FPI	0.782		0.869	
	(0.538)		(0.547)	
Civic education exposure (10 km) * FPI			-9.734	
			(1,635)	
Any party identity				0.772*
				(0.393)
Civic education exposure (10 km) * Any party				-9.593
				(1,162)
Party: RDR	0.803+	0.998+	0.808+	
	(0.465)	(0.517)	(0.464)	
Party: PDCI	-0.0155	0.268	-0.0416	
	(0.811)	(0.839)	(0.810)	
Gender	-0.977**	-1.107*	-0.963**	-0.979**
	(0.372)	(0.437)	(0.373)	(0.372)
Education	-0.166+	-0.194+	-0.169+	-0.176+
	(0.0951)	(0.112)	(0.0952)	(0.0945)
Competitiveness	0.00746	3.763	-0.0812	0.936
	(4.631)	(11.33)	(4.647)	(4.600)
UN Police	-5.129	-42.14	-5.127	-5.106
	(3.453)	(39.04)	(3.458)	(3.454)
UN Military	0.656	9.580	0.701	0.483
	(3.495)	(12.54)	(3.505)	(3.455)
Travel time	-1.752*	-6.464	-1.751*	-1.853*
	(0.789)	(4.049)	(0.790)	(0.780)
Border distance	-2.582	-13.05	-2.612	-2.549
	(2.402)	(12.98)	(2.411)	(2.386)
Infant mortality	-0.0396	3.183	-0.0423	-0.0178
	(0.423)	(4.430)	(0.424)	(0.422)
Population size	-12.83*	-27.17+	-12.79*	-13.08*
	(5.680)	(15.42)	(5.687)	(5.651)
Constant cut1	-3.162	-31.33	-3.193	-2.293
	(4.834)	(35.13)	(4.854)	(4.859)
Constant cut2	-2.192	-30.28	-2.223	-1.322
	(4.835)	(35.13)	(4.855)	(4.861)
Constant cut3	-1.380	-29.27	-1.409	-0.515
	(4.838)	(35.13)	(4.857)	(4.864)
Constant cut4	-1.076		-1.105	-0.214
	(4.840)		(4.860)	(4.867)
Observations	952	778	952	952
Log-Likelihood	-167.3	-120.4	-166.9	-166.6
BIC	657.0	540.5	663.0	648.7
AIC	428.6	330.9	429.8	425.2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$

Figures

Figure 1. Number of elections with a UN PKO (not) engaged in election education


*Figure 2. Temporal distribution of election-education activities*

Figure 3. Spatial distribution of election-education activities

*Figure 4. Temporal distribution of protests and riots compared to other violence*

*Figure 5. Spatial distribution of violent protests and riots during electoral periods*

Figure 6. Spatial distribution of survey measures

Figure 7. Predicted probability of violent protest and rioting


Figure 8. Predicted fear of election violence


Figure 9. Predicted contacting of government officials

Figure 10. Predicted intention to use political violence